Tullock contests with asymmetric information by Einy, Ezra et al.
  
UC3M Working papers     Departamento de Economía 
Economics     Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
13-14                             Calle Madrid, 126 
July, 2013                         28903 Getafe (Spain) 
     Fax (34) 916249875 
TULLOCK CONTESTS WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION *  
E. Einy1, Ori Haimanko1, D. Moreno2, A. Sela1, and B. Shitovitz3 
Abstract 
 
We show that under standard assumptions a Tullock contest with asymmetric information has a 
pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Moreover, two-player common-value Tullock contests in 
which one of the players has an information advantage have a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium 
both players exert the same expected effort, and although the player with information advantage 
wins the prize with probability less than one-half, his payoff is greater or equal to that of his 
opponent. In common-value Tullock contests with more players any information advantage is 
rewarded, but the other properties of two players contests do not hold.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Tullock Contests, Common-Values, All Pay Auctions, Asymmetric Information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1Departamento of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev 
2Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
3Departamento of Economics, University of Haifa 
*Moreno gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, grantECO2011-­‐29762.
1 Introduction
In a Tullock contest Tullock (1980) a players probability of winning the prize is
the ratio of the e¤ort he exerts and the total e¤ort exerted by all the players. Baye and
Hoppe (2003) have identied a variety of economic settings (rent-seeking, innovation
tournaments, patent races) which are strategically equivalent to a Tullock contest.
Tullock contests also arise by design, e.g., sport competition, internal labor markets.
A number of studies have provided an axiomatic justication to such contests, see,
e.g., Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998)).
There is an extensive literature studying Tullock contests and its variations under
complete information about the playersvalue of the prize and their cost of e¤ort.
Perez-Castrillo and Verdier (1992), Baye Kovenock and de Vries (1994), Szidarovszky
and Okuguchi (1997), Cornes and Hartley (2005), Yamazaki (2008) and Chowdhury
and Sheremeta (2009) study existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Skaperdas and
Gan (1995), Glazer and Konrad (1999), Konrad (2002), Cohen and Sela (2005) and
Franke et al. (2011), study the e¤ect on the playersbehavior of changes in the payo¤
structure, and Schweinzer and Segev (2012) and Fu and Lu (2013) study optimal
prize structures. See Konrad (2008) for a general survey.
In this paper we study Tullock contests under asymmetric information (i.e., when
players value for the prize and/or their cost of e¤ort is private information), a topic
seldom investigated in the literature. Fey (2008) andWasser (2013) have recently pro-
vided an analysis of rent-seeking games under incomplete information. More closely
related to our work is Warneryd (2003), which we discuss below.
In our setting, each players value for the prize as well as his cost of e¤ort depend
on the state of nature. The set of states of nature is nite. Players have a common
prior belief, but upon realization of the state of nature, and prior to taking action,
each player observes some event that contains the realized state of nature. The
information of each player at the moment of taking action is therefore described by a
partition of the set of states of nature. (Jackson (1993) and Vohra (1999) have shown
that this representation is equivalent to Harsanyi model of a Bayesian game using
players types.) A contest is therefore described by a set of players, a probability
space describing playersprior uncertainty and their belief, a collection of partitions
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of the state space describing the playersinformation, a collection of state-dependent
functions describing the playersvalues and costs, and a success function specifying
the probability distribution used to allocate the prize for each prole of e¤orts. We
assume throughout that the players cost functions are continuously di¤erentiable,
strictly increasing and convex with respect to e¤ort, and that the cost of exerting no
e¤ort is zero in every state. (In a similar framework, Einy et al. (2001, 2002), Forges
and Orzach (2011), and Malueg and Orzach (2009, 2012) study common-value rst-
and second-price auctions.)
We show that a Tullock contest has a pure strategy Bayesian equilibrium. The
proof involves constructing a sequence of equilibria of contests obtained from the
original Tullock contest by truncating the action space so that it is a closed and
bounded interval whose lower bound approaches zero from above. We show that any
limit point of a sequence of equilibria of these contests (which have an equilibrium
by Nashs Theorem1) is an equilibrium of the original Tullock contest. A key step in
the proof is to show that in any such limit point the total e¤ort exerted by players is
positive in every state of nature.
Our existence result applies regardless of whether players have private or common
values, or whether their costs of e¤ort is the same or di¤erent, and we make no
presumption about the playersprivate information. Moreover, our result extends to
a general class of Tullock like contests which success function is formed as the ratio
between the score given to a players e¤ort and the total scores given to all players,
provided each players score function is strictly increasing and concave. (Warneryd
(2012) establishes existence of equilibrium for common value Tullock contests when
there are two types of players, those that have complete information and those who
only have the prior information, and investigates which players are active, i.e., make
a positive e¤ort, in equilibrium.)
Next we study Tullock contests in which players have a common value for the prize
and a common state independent linear cost function, to which we refer simply as
common-value Tullock contests. We consider rst two-player common-value Tullock
1The payo¤ functions in the truncated contests are continuous, and concave in players own
strategies, which allows the use of the Nashs theorem. However, it cannot be applied to the original,
untruncated, contest, since the payo¤s in it have discontinuity when all e¤orts are equal to zero.
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contests in which one of the players has an information advantage over his opponent
(i.e., the partition of one player is ner than that of his opponent). In our framework,
when one player has an information advantage it can be assumed, without loss of
generality, that one player observes the value while the other player has only the prior
information about the value. Two-player common-value Tullock with this extreme
information asymmetry have been studied by Warneryd (2003) in a setting were
the players common value is a continuous random variable. We reproduce in our
framework some of Warneryd (2003)s results: We show that such contests have a
unique (pure strategy) Bayesian equilibrium, which we characterize. In equilibrium
both players exert the same expected e¤ort and have a positive expected payo¤,
although the payo¤ of the player with an information advantage is greater or equal to
that of his opponent. Moreover, the player with an information advantage wins the
prize less frequently (i.e., with a smaller ex-ante probability) than the uninformed
player. We also examine how players information a¤ects the e¤ort they exert and
their payo¤s. Assuming that the distribution of the playersvalue for the prize is not
too disperse, we show that when one player is better informed than the other the
total e¤ort exerted by the players is smaller, and thus the share of the total surplus
they capture is larger, than when both players have the same information.
We proceed to study whether these results for two-players common-value Tullock
contests extend to contests with more than two players. We show that information
advantage in rewarded in equilibrium in contests with any number of players: in any
equilibrium of a common-value Tullock contests, if a player has an information ad-
vantage over another player then the payo¤ of the former is greater or equal to that
of the later. This result is obtained by observing the formal equivalence between a
common-value Tullock contest and a oligopoly with asymmetric information, and us-
ing the theorem of Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2002) that shows that in any Cournot
Bayesian equilibrium of an oligopolistic industry a rms information advantage is re-
warded. The other properties of equilibrium of two-player contests, however, do not
extend to contests with more than two players. Specically, we show a three-player
example in which two of the players have symmetric information which is superior
to that of the third player, where the expected e¤orts exerted by players di¤er. We
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also provide an example of a contest in which all but one player have the same infor-
mation and the remaining player has an information advantage, in which the ex-ante
probability that the player with information advantage wins the prize is greater than
that of any of the other players.
We also study the relative e¤ectiveness of Tullock contests and all-pay auctions
to induce players to exert e¤ort. In the same framework we work at, and under the
same assumptions, Einy et al. (2013) characterize the unique equilibrium of a two-
player common-value all-pay auctions, which is in mixed strategies, and show that
the expected payo¤ of the player with an information advantage is positive while the
expected payo¤ of his opponent is zero, and that both the expected e¤ort and the
ex-ante probability of winning the prize are the same for both players. Using the
results in Einy et al. (2013) and our results we show that the sign of the di¤erence
in the total e¤ort exerted by players in a Tullock contest and an all-pay auction is
undetermined, and may be either positive or negative depending on the distribution
of the playersvalue for the prize see Example 1. (Fang (2002) and Epstein, Mealem
and Nitzan (2011) study the outcomes of Tullock contests and all-pay auction under
complete information.)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the general
setting. In Section 3 we establish that every Tullock contest has a pure strategy
Bayesian equilibrium. Section 4 and 5 study common-value Tullock contests with
two players, and with more players, respectively. Section 6 concludes. Long proofs
are given in the Appendix.
2 Tullock Contests
A group of players N = f1; :::; ng; with n  2; compete for a prize by choosing a
level of e¤ort in R+. Playersuncertainty about the state of nature is described by
a probability space (
; p); where 
 is a nite set and p is a probability distribution
over 
 describing the playerscommon prior belief about the realized state of nature.
W.l.o.g. we assume that p(!) > 0 for every ! 2 
. The private information about
the state of nature of player i 2 N is described by a partition i of 
: The value for
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the prize for each player i is described by a random variable Vi : 
 ! R++, i.e., if
! 2 
 is realized then player is (private) value for the prize is Vi(!). The cost of
e¤ort of each player i 2 N is described by a function ci : 
  R+ ! R+, which is
continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and convex in e¤ort xi, and such that
ci(; 0) = 0 on 
:
A contest starts by a move of nature that selects a state ! from 
 according to the
distribution p: Every player i 2 N observes the element i(!) of i which contains !.
Then players simultaneously choose their e¤ort levels (x1; :::; xn) 2 Rn+. The prize is
awarded in a probabilistic fashion, according to a success function ; which attributed
to each prole of e¤ort levels x 2 Rn+ a probability distribution (x) in the n-simplex
according to which the prize recipient is chosen. Hence, the payo¤ of player i 2 N;
ui : 
 Rn+ ! R, is given for every ! 2 
 and x 2 Rn+ by
ui(!; x) = i (x)Vi(!)  ci (!; xi) : (1)
Thus, a contest is described by a collection (N; (
; p); figi2N ; fVigi2N ; fcigi2N ; ):
In a contest, a pure strategy of player i 2 N is a i-measurable function Xi : 
!
R+ (i.e., Xi is constant on every element of i); that represents is choice of e¤ort in
each state of nature following the observation of his private information. We denote
by Si the set of strategies of player i, and by S =
Qn
i=1 Si the set of strategy proles.
For any strategy Xi 2 Si and i 2 i; Xi (i) stands for the constant value that Xi ()
takes on i. Also, given a strategy prole X = (X1; :::; Xn) 2 S; we denote by X i
the prole obtained from X by suppressing the strategy of player i 2 N: Throughout
the paper we restrict attention to pure strategies.
Let X = (X1; :::; Xn) be a strategy prole. We denote by Ui(X) the expected
payo¤ of player i, which is given by
Ui(X)  E[ui(; (X1 () ; :::; Xn ())]:
For i 2 i; we denote by Ui(X j i) the expected payo¤ of player i conditional on
i; i.e.,
Ui(X j i)  E[ui(; (X1 () ; :::; Xn ()) j i]:
An N -tuple of strategies X = (X1 ; :::; X

N) is a Bayesian equilibrium if for every
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player i 2 N , and every strategy Xi 2 Si
Ui(X
)  Ui(X i; Xi); (2)
or equivalently,
Ui(X
 j i)  Ui(X i; Xi j i) (3)
for every i 2 i:
3 Existence of Equilibrium in Tullock Contests
Tullock contests are identied by a class of success functions T such that for x 2
Rn+nf0g the probability that player i 2 N wins the prize is
Ti (x) =
xi
x
; (4)
where x PNk=1 xk is the total e¤ort exerted by the players. Theorem 1 establishes
that under our assumptions a Tullock contest has a pure strategy equilibrium.
Theorem 1. Every Tullock contest has a (pure) strategy Bayesian equilibrium.
Note that Theorem 1 makes no presumption about the playersprivate informa-
tion, and applies regardless of whether players have private or common values, or
whether their costs of e¤ort is the same or di¤erent. A direct implication of Theorem
1 is the existence of equilibrium for a general class of success functions. For this class
of success functions, Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) have established existence of
a unique equilibrium when players have complete information.
Corollary 1. Every contest in which the success function  is given for x 2 Rn+nf0g
and i 2 N by
i (x) =
gi (xi)Pn
j=1 gj (xj)
;
where, for every j 2 N; gj : R+ ! R+ is strictly increasing and concave bijection2,
has a Bayesian equilibrium.
2Functions gj do not, in fact, need to be bijections, for our claim to hold. This can be shown
using the same argument as in the proof below, provided Theorem 1 is extended to hold for contests
where the levels of e¤ort are restricted to be in a set [a; b) for 0  a  b and b 2 R+ [ f1g (under
the additional assumption that limx!b ci(; x) =1). This extension of Theorem 1 can be obtained
by essentially the same proof as the one given in the Appendix.
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Proof. Let C = (N; (
; p); figi2N ; fVigi2N ; fcigi2N ; ) be a contest satisfying
the assumptions of Corollary 1 for (g1; :::; gn). The Tullock contest (N; (
; p); figi2N ;
fVigi2N ; fcigi2N ; T ) where ci (; ) = ci
 ; g 1i () for every i 2 N and T (0) = (0)
has a Bayesian equilibrium X = (X1 ; :::; X

n) by Theorem 1. It is easy to see that
Y  = (g 11 X1 ; :::; g 1n Xn) is a Bayesian equilibrium of C: 
4 Two-Player Common-Value Tullock Contests
Henceforth we study contests in which players have a common value for the prize
and a common state-independent linear cost function, i.e., for all i 2 N; Vi = V; and
ci (; x)  x on 
. We refer to these contests as common-value contests, and they are
described by a collection (N; (
; p); (i)i2N ; V; ). Let us index the set of states of
nature as 
 = f!1; :::; !mg; write p(!k) = pk and V (!k) = vk for k 2 f1; :::;mg, and
assume, w.l.o.g., that 0 < v1  v2 < :::  vm.
In this section we study two-player common-value Tullock contests in which player
2 has an information advantage over player 1 (i.e., n = 2 and 2 is ner than 1).
Thus, we may assume w.l.o.g. that the only information player 1 has about the state
is the common prior belief, i.e., 1 = f
g, whereas player 2 has perfect information
about the state of nature, i.e., 2 = ff!1g; :::; f!mgg. In such contests a strategy
prole is a pair (X; Y ); where X can be identied with x 2 R+ that species player
1s unconditional e¤ort, and Y can be identied with (y1; :::; ym) 2 Rm+ that species
the e¤ort of player 2 in each of the m states of nature. Thus, abusing notation, we
shall write X = x and Y = (y1; :::; ym) whenever appropriate.
The following notation will be useful in characterizing the pure strategy Bayesian
equilibria of a Tullock contest. For k 2 f1; :::;mg write
Ak =
 
mX
s=k
ps
p
vs
! 
1 +
mX
s=k
ps
! 1
: (5)
Note that
A1 =
E(
p
V )
2
:
7
Lemma 1 establishes a key property of the sequence fAkgmk=1 :
Lemma 1. If
p
vk > Ak for some k < m; then
p
vk > Ak and Ak > Ak for all
k > k:
Proposition 1 shows that a two-player common-value Tullock contest in which
player 2 has an information advantage has a unique pure strategy equilibrium with
the following explicit description. Let k 2 f1; :::;mg be the smallest index such that
p
vk > Ak: Since
p
vm >
pm
(1 + pm)
p
vm = Am;
k is well dened.
Proposition 1. A two-player common-value Tullock contest in which player 2 has
an information advantage has a unique Bayesian equilibrium (X; Y ) given by
x = A2k ;
yk = 0
for all k < k; and
yk = Ak (
p
vk   Ak)
for all k  k.
Proposition 1 in particular implies uniqueness and symmetry of equilibrium in
the complete information case, i.e., when m = 1. (Note that in this case k = 1;
and therefore y1 = A1(
p
v1   A1) = v1=2   v1=4 = A21 = x. This result is well
known in the literature.) When m > 1, we have
p
v1 > A1 = E(
p
V )=2 (and hence
k = 1) whenever the distribution of values is not too disperse; e.g., this inequality
holds when vm < 4v1: When this is the case, the unique equilibrium is interior. For
future references we state this observation in Remark 2.
Remark 2. Consider a two-player common-value Tullock contest in which player 2
has an information advantage. The unique Bayesian equilibrium is interior if and
only if
p
v1 > E(
p
V )=2, i.e., the distribution of values is not too disperse.
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Interestingly, when one player has superior information the expected e¤ort exerted
by players in the equilibrium of the contest is the same.
Proposition 2. In a two-player common-value Tullock contest in which player 2 has
an information advantage both players exert the same (expected) e¤ort, i.e.,
E(Y ) = A2k = x
 = X: (6)
Hence the expected total e¤ort is
TE = X + E(Y ) = 2A2k :
Proof. By Proposition 1,
E(Y ) =
mX
s=1
psy

s
=
mX
s=k
psAk (
p
vk   Ak)
= Ak
mX
s=k
ps
p
vk   A2k
mX
s=k
ps
= A2k
 
1 +
mX
s=k
ps
!
  A2k
mX
s=k
ps
= A2k :
In a two-player common-value Tullock contest in which player 2 has an information
advantage the equilibrium probabilities that player 1 wins the prize when the state
is !k is
1k := 
T
1 (x
; yk) =
A2k
A2k + Ak
 p
vk   Ak
 = Akp
vk
when k  k; whereas the probability that player 2 wins the prize is 2k = 1   1k:
Thus, the larger is the realized value of the prize, the smaller (larger) is the probability
that player 1 (player 2) wins the prize, i.e., 1k0  1k and 2k0  2k for k0 > k  k;
with a strict inequality if vk0 > vk: Of course, the larger is the realized value of the
prize, the larger is the e¤ort of player 2, i.e.,
yk0 = Ak (
p
vk0   Ak)  Ak (pvk   Ak) = yk:
9
for k0 > k  k (with a strict inequality if vk0 > vk). Additionally, for k0 > k  k;
1k0vk0 = Ak
p
vk0  Akpvk = 1kvk
(with a strict inequality if vk0 > vk), i.e., the larger is the realized value of the prize,
the larger is the conditional expected payo¤ of player 1; also,
2k0vk0  2kvk0  2kvk
(with a strict inequality if vk0 > vk), i.e., the larger is the realized value of the prize,
the larger is the conditional expected payo¤ of player 2. Write i = E(

i ) for the
ex-ante probability that player i wins the prize. Proposition 3 establishes another
interesting property of equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Consider a two-player common-value Tullock contest in which player
2 has an information advantage. If v1 < v2 < ::: < vm, then the ex-ante probability
that player 1 wins the prize is greater than that of player 2, i.e., 1 > 

2:
Remark 3 states that under symmetric information each player exerts an expected
e¤ort equal to E(V )=4: The proof of this result is straightforward, and is therefore
omitted.
Remark 3. A two-player common-value Tullock contest in which players have
symmetric information has a unique pure strategy equilibrium, which is symmetric
and involves each player exerting an expected e¤ort equal to E(V )=4:
The surplus captured by the players in a contest is the di¤erence between the
expected (total) surplus E(V ) and the expected total e¤ort they exert. In Proposition
4 below we show that when player 2 has an information advantage, in an interior
equilibrium players exert less e¤ort, and therefore capture a greater surplus, than
when they are symmetrically informed.
Proposition 4. Consider a two-player common-value Tullock contest in which player
2 has an information advantage. If v1 < vm and the distribution of values is not too
disperse, i.e.,
p
v1 > E(
p
V )=2, then the playersexert less e¤ort and hence capture
a greater share of the surplus than when both players have symmetric information.
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Proof. When player 2 has an information advantage, then
p
v1 > E(
p
V )=2
implies that the equilibrium is interior by Remark 2, and therefore the expected total
e¤ort is TE = 2A21 =

E(
p
V )
2
=2 by Proposition 2. When players have symmetric
information the expected total e¤ort TE is TE = E(V )=2 by Remark 3. Then
v1 < vm together with Jensens inequality imply
TE   TE = E(V )
2
 

E(
p
V )
2
2
> 0: 
Warneryd (2003) establishes counterparts to Propositions 1 to 4 when the players
common-value V is a continuous random variable, and shows that the fully informed
player obtains a greater payo¤ than the uninformed player. This latter result also
holds when V is a discrete random variable, and, as it turns out, even outside the
two-player case. Indeed, we will show in Theorem 2 in the next section that in
a common-value Tullock contest with two or more players, when a player has an
information advantage over another player (not necessarily an extreme one), then in
any Bayesian equilibrium the payo¤ of the former is greater or equal to that of the
latter.
We conclude this section studying what can be said about the playersexpected
total e¤ort in all pay auctions and Tullock contests. The contests arising in many
economic and political applications are e¤ectively all pay auctions either by design
(e.g., sports or political competition) or by the nature of the problem (e.g., a patent
races).
A common-value all-pay auction is a common-value contest in which the suc-
cess function is given for x 2 Rn+ by APA(x) = 1=m(x) if xi = maxfxjgj2N ; and
APA(x) = 0 otherwise, where m(x) = jk 2 N : xk = maxfxjgj2N j. Einy et. al.
(2013) show that in unique equilibrium of a two-player common-value all-pay auction
in which v1 < ::: < vm and player 2 observes the value while player 1 does not, the
playerstotal expected e¤ort is
TEAPA = 2
mX
s=1
ps
 
s 1X
k=1
pkvk +
1
2
psvs
!
= 2
mX
s=1
ps
s 1X
k=1
pkvk +
mX
s=1
p2svs:
Hence the di¤erence between total e¤orts in an all-pay auction and a Tullock contest
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is
 := TEAPA   TE = 2
mX
s=1
ps
s 1X
k=1
pkvk +
mX
s=1
p2svs   2A2k :
For simplicity, consider the case where there are only two states of nature, i.e., m = 2:
If the equilibrium of the Tullock contest is interior, then
 = 2p1p2v1 +
 
p21v1 + p
2
2v2
  2A21
= 2p1p2v1 + p
2
1v1 + p
2
2v2   2
 
p1
p
v1 + p2
p
v2
2
4
= 2p1p2v1 +
1
2
(p1
p
v1   p2pv2)2
> 0:
Hence an all-pay auction generates more e¤ort that a Tullock contest. However, if
the Tullock contest has a corner equilibrium, then
 = 2p1p2v1 +
 
p21v1 + p
2
2v2
  2A22
= 2p1p2v1 + p
2
1v1 + p
2
2v2   2
 
p2
p
v2
2
(1 + p2)2
= p1v1(1 + p2)  p22v2

2
(1 + p2)
2   1

:
Thus,  may be either positive or negative depending on the distribution of the
playerscommon value see Example 1 below. Hence the level of e¤ort generated by
these two contests cannot be ranked in general.
The following example illustrates our ndings.
Example 1. Let m = 2, p1 = 1   p; v1 = 1; and v2 = v; where p 2 (0; 1) and
v 2 (1;1): Then E(V ) = 1   p(1   v), E(pV ) = 1   p(1   pv); A1 = E(
p
V )=2,
and A2 = p
p
v=(1 + p): If v < (1 + p)2 =p2; then
p
v1 = 1 > A1 and k = 1; otherwise
k = 2:
In a Tullock contest in which player 2 observes the value but player 1 does not,
the unique equilibrium is
X = A21; Y
 = (A1 (1  A1) ; A1
 p
v   A1

);
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and the total e¤ort is TE = 2A21 = [1   p(1  
p
v)]2=2 when v < (1 + p)2 =p2.
Otherwise, the unique equilibrium is
X = A22; Y
 = (0; A2
 p
v   A2

);
and the total e¤ort is TE = 2A22 = 2p
2v=(1+p)2: If v < (1 + p)2 =p2; then the ex-ante
probability that player 1 wins the prize is
1 = (1  p)A1 + p
A1p
v
=
1
2
 
p+ (1  p)pv 1  p+ ppvp
v
 1
1 + p
>
1
2
:
Otherwise, this probability is
1 = (1  p) + p
A2p
v
= (1  p) + p
2
1 + p
=
1
1 + p
>
1
2
:
Hence, consistently with Proposition 3 the uninformed player wins the prize more
frequently than the informed player. Further, if v < (1 + p)2 =p2, then
2 [U2(X
; Y )  U1(X; Y )] = (1  p) A1 (1  A1)  A
2
1
A21 + A1 (1  A1)
+ pv
A1 (
p
v   A1)  A21
A21 + A1 (
p
v   A1)
= (1  p) p  1 pv2
> 0:
And if v  (1 + p)2 =p2, then
2 [U2(X
; Y )  U1(X; Y )] =   (1  p) + pvA2 (
p
v   A2)  A22
A22 + A2 (
p
v   A2)
=
1  p
p+ 1
(p(v   1)  1)
>
1  p
p
> 0:
That is, the payo¤of the informed player is greater or equal to that of the uninformed
player. (We show in Theorem below the information advantage is always rewarded in
a common-value Tullock contest, regardless of the number of players and the number
of states of nature.)
Under symmetric information the equilibrium total e¤ort in a Tullock contest is
E(V )=2 > maxf2A21; 2A22g; i.e., the total e¤ort when player 2 has an information
advantage is less than when both players have the same information.
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In an all pay auction in which player 2 observes the value but player 1 does not,
the equilibrium total e¤ort is
TEAPA = 2 (1  p) p+ (1  p)2 + p2v = (1  p) (1 + p) + p2v:
As we have shown above, if v < (1 + p)2 =p2; then the expected total e¤ort in the
unique equilibrium of the Tullock contest, which is interior, is TE = 2A22 = [1 p(1 p
v)]2=2: Hence
TEAPA   TE = (1  p) (1 + p) + p2v   (1  p(1 
p
v))2
2
> 2p > 0:
However, if v  (1 + p)2 =p2; then the expected total e¤ort in the unique equilibrium
of the Tullock contest, which is a corner equilibrium, is TE = 2p2v= (1 + p)2 : Assume
that p = 1=4. Then
TEAPA   TE = 15
16
  7
400
v:
Hence TEAPA < TE for v > 375=7.
5 n-Player Common-Value Tullock Contests
In this section we study whether the properties of two-player common-value Tullock
contests extend to contests with more than two players. We begin by establishing
in Theorem 2 a general property of common-value Tullock contests: these contests
reward information advantage. Theorem 2 is a direct implication of the theorem of
Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2002).
Theorem 2. Let X = (X1 ; :::; X

n) be any equilibrium of an n-player common-
value Tullock contest. If player i has an information advantage over player j, then
Ui(X)  Uj(X).
Proof. An n-player common-value Tullock contest (N; (
; p); (i)i2N ; V ) is for-
mally identical to what Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2002) refer to as an oligopolist
industry (N; (
; p); P; c; (i)i2N); where the demand and cost functions are dened
for (!; x) 2 
 R++ as
P (!; x) =
V (!)
x
;
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and
c(!; x) = x;
respectively. With this convention, the state-dependent prot of rm i 2 N in the
industry coincides with the payo¤ of player i 2 N in the contest, i.e., for ! 2 
 and
X 2 S;
ui(!;X) =
V (!)Pn
s=1Xs
Xi(!) Xi(!)
= P (!;
nX
s=1
Xs(!))Xi(!)  c(!;Xi(!)):
Theorem 2 then follows from the theorem of Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2002).3 
The following example shows that Proposition 2 does not extend to common-value
Tullock contests with more than two players. In the example, player 1 has only prior
information whereas players 2 and 3 have complete information. In equilibrium the
expected e¤ort of the uninformed player is below that of each of the informed players.
Example 2. Consider a 3-player common-value Tullock contest in which m = 2;
p1 = p2 = 1=2, v1 = 1 and v2 = 2: Player 1 has no information, i.e., his information
partition is 1 = f!1; !2g; and players 2 and 3 have complete information, i.e., their
information partitions are 2 = 3 = ff!1g; f!2gg: In the interior equilibrium of
this contest, which is readily calculated by solving the system of equations formed by
the playersreaction functions, the e¤ort of player 1 is X1 = 0:30899 while the e¤orts
of players 2 and 3 are X2 = X

3 = (0:20342; 0:46933). Note that
X1 = 0:30899 <
1
2
(0:20342 + 0:46933) = E(X2 ) = E(X

3 );
i.e., the e¤ort of player 1 is less than the expected e¤ort of players 2 and 3.
The next example shows that Proposition 3 does not extend to contests with
more than two players. In the example there is an informed player and a number of
3The demand function P (!; x) is not di¤erentiable at x = 0 it is not even dened and therefore
does not formally satisfy the assumptions of Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2002). However, it is easy
to see that in any equilibrium X of a common-value Tullock contest the total e¤ort is positive in all
states of nature, i.e., X() > 0: Thus the non-di¤erentiability at 0 is irrelevant, and the proof of the
theorem in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2002) applies in this case with no change.
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uninformed players. Contrary to the spirit of Proposition 3, the ex-ante probability
that the informed player wins the prize is above that of the uninformed players.
Example 3. Consider an eight player common-value Tullock contest in which
m = 2; p1 = p2 = 1=2, v1 = 1 and v2 = 2: Players 1 to 7 have no information, i.e., their
information partition is i = f!1; !2g for i 2 f1; :::; 7g; and player 8 is completely
informed, i.e., his information partitions is 8 = ff!1g; f!2gg: This contest has a
(corner) equilibrium given by
X1 = ::: = X

7 = 0:15551; X

8 = (0; 0:38694) :
In equilibrium, the ex-ante probability that player i 2 f1; 2; :::; 7g wins the prize is
i =
1
2
(
1
7
+
0:155 51
7(0:155 51) + 0:386 94
) = 0:12413;
whereas the ex-ante probability that player 8 win the prize is
8 = 1  7(0:12413) = 0:13109:
Thus, the informed player wins the prize more frequently than an uninformed player.
6 Concluding remarks
Under broad conditions, Tullock contests have pure strategy equilibria. Two-player
common-value Tullock contests in which one player has an information advantage ex-
hibit interesting properties: an equilibrium is unique, although it may not be interior.
And regardless of whether the equilibrium is interior or not, both players exert the
same expected e¤ort, although the player with an information advantage obtains a
payo¤ greater or equal to his opponent, and wins the object less frequently than him.
When the equilibrium is interior, which occurs when the distribution of the players
common value is not too disperse, the players exert less e¤ort than when they are
symmetrically informed. (It is an open question whether this property holds when
the distribution of values is su¢ ciently disperse and the unique equilibrium is a corner
equilibrium.) While the information advantage is rewarded in common-value Tullock
contests regardless of whether there are two or more players, the other properties of
16
equilibrium obtained for two-player contests may not hold in contests with more than
two players. Interestingly, a Tullock contest may generate more e¤ort than an all-pay
auction.
7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Let C = (N; (
; p); figi2N ; fVigi2N ; fcigi2N ; T ) be a Tullock
contest. Since the cost function of each player is strictly increasing and convex in the
players e¤ort, it follows from (1) that there exists Q > 0 such that ui(; x) < 0 for
every i 2 N and every x 2 Rn+; provided xi > Q: For any 0 < " < Q consider a variant
of the contest, denoted by C"; in which the e¤ort set of each player i is restricted
to be the bounded interval [";Q] : In C"; the set of strategies of player i, Si;", is
identiable with the compact set [";Q]i via the the bijection xi  ! (xi (i))i2i .
Player is expected payo¤ function Ui is continuous on S" = ni=1Si;" (since the
success function  in (4) is continuous if e¤orts are restricted to [";Q]), and it is
concave in is own strategy (as the state-dependent payo¤ function ui(; x) is concave
in the variable xi if e¤orts are restricted to [";Q]). Nashs Theorem thus guarantees
existence of a Bayesian equilibrium in C"; pick one such equilibrium and denote it by
X" = (X

1;"; :::; X

n;").
We show that
lim inf
"!0+
X" () > 0:
Indeed, suppose to the contrary that there is a vanishing positive sequence f"kg1k=1
such that
lim
k!1
min
!2

X"k (!) = 0; (7)
and x ! 2 
 such that
X"k (!
) = min
!2

X"k (!) (8)
for innitely many k (and thus, w.l.o.g., for every k). Since the expected payo¤ of
player i is negative in every state of nature when xi = Q; for any su¢ ciently small
"k the equilibrium strategy Xi;"k satises X

i;"k () < Q: Thus, for a given i 2 i;
Xi (i) 2 ["k; Q): Additionally, Xi and Xi (i) can both be viewed as the argument
of the function Ui(X i;"k ; Xi j i); since Xi (i) is the only numerical input needed to
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determine the conditional expected payo¤ of player i given i; when the equilibrium
strategies of players other than i are X i;"k . Since the equilibrium strategy X

i;"k is a
(local) maximizer of Ui(X i;"k ; Xi j i) by (3),
dUi(X i;"k ; Xi; j i)
dXi (i)

Xi(i)=Xi;"k (i)
 0:
That is,
dE[ui(; X i;"k () ; Xi (i) j i]
dXi (i)

Xi(i)=Xi;"k (i)
 0;
or, equivalently,
E

dui(; X i;"k () ; Xi;"k (i))
dxi
j i

 0:
Using (4) and (1) we calculate the derivative explicitly,
E
"
Vi()
X"k ()
  X

i;"k (i)Vi()
X"k ()2
  d
dxi
ci
 ; Xi;"k (i) j i
#
 0:
Thus
E

Vi()
X"k ()
  d
dxi
ci
 ; Xi;"k (i) j i Xi;"k (i)E
"
Vi()
X"k ()2
j i
#
 0;
which leads to
Xi;"k (i) 
E

Vi()
X"k ()
  d
dxi
ci
 ; Xi;"k (i) j i
E
"
Vi()
X"k ()2
j i
# : (9)
Inequality (9) holds, in particular, for i = i (!) : Since Xi;"k (!
) = Xi;"k (i (!
))
(as, by denition, ! 2 i (!)); (9) yields
Xi;"k (!
) 
E

Vi()
X"k ()
  d
dxi
ci
 ; Xi;"k (!) j i (!)
E
"
Vi()
X"k ()2
j i (!)
# : (10)
Summing over i 2 N we obtain
X"k (!
) 
nX
i=1
E

Vi()
X"k ()
  d
dxi
ci
 ; Xi;"k (!) j i (!)
E
"
Vi()
X"k ()2
j i (!)
# ;
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or (since X"k (!
)  n" > 0)
1 
nX
i=1
E
 X"k (!)
X"k ()
Vi()  X"k (!) ddxi ci
 ; Xi;"k (!) j i (!)
E
"
X"k (!
)2
X"k ()2
Vi() j i (!)
# : (11)
By the denition of X"k (!
) (see (8)),
0 
X"k (!
)
X"k (!)
 1
for every ! 2 
: Hence we assume w.l.o.g. (by moving to a subsequence if necessary)
that the limit
a (!) = lim
k!1
X"k (!
)
X"k (!)
exists for every ! 2 
: Note also that a (!) = 1 for ! = !, which occurs with positive
probability by our assumption on p; and thus
lim
k!1
E
"
X"k (!
)2
X"k ()2
Vi() j i (!)
#
= E

a ()2 Vi() j i (!)

> 0: (12)
Also, (7) and (8) imply
lim
k!1
E
"
X"k (!
)
dci
 ; Xi;"k (!)
dxi
j i (!)
#
= 0: (13)
Taking limit of the right-hand side of (11), which exists by (12) and (13), we get
1 
nX
i=1
E[a ()Vi() j i (!)]
E[a ()2 Vi() j i (!)]
:
Furthermore, as 0  a ()2  a ()  1; we obtain
1 
nX
i=1
E[a ()Vi() j i (!)]
E[a ()2 Vi() j i (!)]
 n:
Since by assumption n  2; we have reached a contradiction. This proves that,
indeed,
lim inf
"!0+
X" () > 0: (14)
Now let f"kg1k=1 be a vanishing positive sequence such that the limit
Xi (!)  lim
k!1
Xi;"k (!)
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exists for every i 2 N and ! 2 
: (Such a sequence exists since all Xi;" (!) belong
to the compact interval [0; Q]:) Obviously, X = (X1 ; :::; X

n) constitutes a strategy
prole in the contest C; and it follows from (14) that
X () > 0: (15)
We show that X is a Bayesian equilibrium of C.
Since the state-dependent payo¤ function ui(; x) is continuous at any point x
with x > 0, for every i 2 N , every i 2 i; and every sequence fYkg1k=0 of strategy
proles such that Y0 () > 0 and Yi;0 (!) = limk!1 Yi;k (!) for every i and !; we have
lim
k!1
Ui(Y1;k; :::; Yn;k j i) = Ui(Y1;0; :::; Yn;0 j i): (16)
Since every X" is a Bayesian equilibrium in C"; for every su¢ ciently large k and every
strategy Xi of player i satisfying 0 < Xi ()  Q we have
Ui(X

"k
j i)  Ui(X i;"k ; Xi j i): (17)
Applying the limit as k ! 1 to both sides of inequality (17), it follows from (16)
(and the fact (15)) that
Ui(X
 j i)  Ui(X i; Xi j i) (18)
for every strategy Xi of player i satisfying 0 < Xi ()  Q and every i 2 i:
It is easy to see that
lim inf
xi!0+
Ui(X

 i; xi j i)  Ui(X i; 0 j i);
where xi > 0 (respectively, xi = 0) is identied with a strategy of i for whichXi (i) =
xi (respectively, Xi (i) = 0): Thus (18) in fact holds for every strategy Xi satisfying
0  Xi ()  Q (i.e., the deviations of i may be zero at some states of nature).
Finally, note that player i can improve upon any strategy Xi for which Xi (!) > Q
at some ! by lowering the e¤ort on i(!) to zero and thus receiving non-negative
expected payo¤ conditional on i(!): Thus, in contemplating a unilateral deviation
from Xi ; player i is never worse o¤ by limiting himself to strategies Xi satisfying
0  Xi ()  Q: But this implies that (18) holds for every strategy Xi 2 Si: Since this
is the case for every i 2 N , we have shown that X is a Bayesian equilibrium of C. 
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Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that
p
vk > Ak for some k < m:
We show that
p
vk > Ak for all k > k: Suppose not; let k^ > k be the rst index
k > k such that for
p
vk  Ak: Note that vk^  vk^ 1 and pvk^ 1 > Ak^ 1 imply0@1 + mX
s=k^
ps
1Apvk^ 
0@1 + mX
s=k^ 1
ps
1Apvk^ 1   pk^ 1pvk^ 1
>
0@1 + mX
s=k^ 1
ps
1AAk^ 1   pk^ 1pvk^ 1
=
mX
s=k^ 1
ps
p
vs   pk^ 1
p
vk^ 1
=
0@1 + mX
s=k^
ps
1AAk^;
which contradicts the assumption that
p
vk^  Ak^:
Now we show that Ak > Ak for all k > k: Suppose not; let ~k > k be the rst
index k > k such that Ak  Ak: Since pv~k 1 > A~k 1 (as we have just shown), then0@1 + mX
s=~k 1
ps
1AA~k 1 = mX
s=~k 1
ps
p
vs
= p~k 1
p
v~k 1 +
mX
s=~k
ps
p
vs
> p~k 1A~k 1 +
0@1 + mX
s=~k
ps
1AA~k:
Hence 0@1 + mX
s=~k 1
ps
1AA~k 1   p~k 1A~k 1 >
0@1 + mX
s=~k
ps
1AA~k;
i.e., 0@1 + mX
s=~k
ps
1AA~k 1 >
0@1 + mX
s=~k
ps
1AA~k:
Thus, Ak  A~k 1 > A~k; which contradicts the choice of ~k. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let (X; Y ); where X = x and Y = (y1; :::; ym), be a
Bayesian equilibrium, whose existence is guaranteed by Theorem 1. We show that
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x > 0: If x = 0; then T2 (0) = 1; since otherwise player 2 does not have a best response
against x = 0: But then y1 = y2 = ::: = ym = 0; and therefore player 1 can protably
deviate by exerting an arbitrarily small e¤ort " > 0: Hence x > 0: Moreover, yk > 0
for some k 2 f1; :::;mg since otherwise x > 0 is not a best response of player 1:
Since x > 0 maximizes player 1s payo¤ given Y , then
@
@x
 
mX
s=1
ps

vs
x
x+ ys
  x
!
=
mX
s=1
psvs
ys
(x+ ys)
2   1 = 0: (19)
And since ys maximizes player 2s payo¤ in state !s given x; then
@
@ys

vs
ys
x+ ys
  ys

= vs
x
(x+ ys)
2   1  0; (20)
(with equality if ys > 0) for each s = 1; :::;m.
Notice next that if yk > 0 for some k < m; then yk0 > 0 for all k0 > k: Since
x > 0; if yk > 0 then yk =
p
x
 p
vk  
p
x

by (20), and since vk0  vk for all k0 > k;
p
x
 p
vk0  
p
x

> 0, i.e.,
vk0
x
x2
  1 > 0;
for all k0 > k: Then yk0 = 0 would violate inequality (20) for s = k0: Hence yk0 > 0:
Let k be the smallest index such that yk > 0: Thus, x > 0 and (19) imply
mX
s=1
psvs
ys
(x+ ys)
2 =
mX
s=k
psvs
ys
(x+ ys)
2 = 1;
and (20) implies yk0 =
p
x
 p
vk0  
p
x

> 0 for all k0  k: Hence x = A2k ; yk =
Ak
 p
vk   Ak

for all k  k; and yk = 0 for all k < k:
We now show that k = k, which establishes that the prole (x; y1; :::; y

m)
identied in Proposition 1 is the unique equilibrium. Assume rst that k < k:
Then
p
vk  Ak since k is the smallest index such that pvk > Ak; and hence
yk =
p
x
 p
vk  
p
x

= Ak
 p
vk   Ak
  0; a contradiction as yk > 0 by the
denition of k: Assume next that k > k: In this case, yk = 0: Since
p
vk > Ak ;
by Lemma 1
A2k > A
2
k = x; (21)
and therefore
vk
x
x2
  1 = A
2
k
A4k
 
vk   A2k

> 0:
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This stands in contradiction to (20), as yk = 0 by the denition of k(> k): We
conclude that indeed k = k. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us be given a two-player common-value Tullock contest
in which player 2 has an information advantage over player 1. Given (yk ; ::::; ym) 2
Rk+ dene the function
p2 (yk ; :::; ym) :=
mX
k=k
pkyk
yk +
Pm
s=k psys
:
Hence, recalling (6), 2 = p2 (y

k ; :::; y

m). We show that a maximum point y of p2 on
K = f(yk ; ::::; ym) 2 Rk+ j yk  yk+1:::  ymg must satisfy yk = ::: = ym: Hence
max
K
p2 =
Pm
s=k ps
1 +
Pm
s=k ps
 1
2
: (22)
Since yk < ::: < y

m (the inequalities are strict, which follows from our assumption
that v1 < v2 < ::: < vm and the expressions for (yk)
m
k=k given in Proposition 1), (22)
implies
2 = p2 (y

k ; :::; y

m) < max
K
p2  1=2;
which establishes Proposition 3.
Di¤erentiating p2 with respect to yk for k 2 fk; :::;mg we get
@p2
@yk
= pk
 
mX
t=k;t 6=k
ptyt
(yk +
Pm
s=k psys)
2
 
mX
t=k;t 6=k
ptyt
(yt +
Pm
s=k psys)
2
!
: (23)
For every (yk ; :::; ym) 2 K such that yk < yk+1  :::  ym; @p2=@yk (y) > 0;
and therefore necessarily yk = yk+1. Suppose now that it has already been shown
that yk = yk+1 = ::: = yk; m   1  k > 1: We show that yk+1 = yk as well.
Indeed, if yk = yk+1 = ::: = yk < yk+1  :::  ym, then by (23) we obtain that
@p2=@yk (y) > 0; a contradiction. Thus yk = ::: = ym: 
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